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Abstract—Quality control plays a critical role in crowdsourcing. The state-of-the-art work is not suitable for large-scale crowdsourcing
applications, since it is a long haul for the requestor to verify task quality or select professional workers in a one-by-one mode. In this
paper, we propose a misreport- and collusion-proof crowdsourcing mechanism, guiding workers to truthfully report the quality of
submitted tasks without collusion by designing a mechanism, so that workers have to act the way the requestor would like. In detail, the
mechanism proposed by the requester makes no room for the workers to obtain profit through quality misreport and collusion, and
thus, the quality can be controlled without any verification. Extensive simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed
mechanism. Finally, the importance and originality of our work lie in that it reveals some interesting and even counterintuitive findings:
1) a high-quality worker may pretend to be a low-quality one; 2) the rise of task quality from high-quality workers may not result in the
increased utility of the requestor; 3) the utility of the requestor may not get improved with the increasing number of workers. These
findings can boost forward looking and strategic planning solutions for crowdsourcing.
Index Terms—Crowdsourcing, Collusion-proof, Mechanism design.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet openness renders crowdsourcing to gather ge-
ographically dispersed human resources for accomplishing
complex tasks that are easy for human beings while difficult
for machines. However, just also due to the openness of the
Internet, any people can apply for participating in crowd-
sourcing, which may incur unprofessional crowdsourcees
(workers) with low-quality contributions. Thus, there is a
pressing need for quality control in crowdsourcing. The
state-of-the-art quality control in crowdsourcing can be cate-
gorized into two kinds: task-based [1]–[4] and worker-based
[5]–[9]. The former kind is a direct way which proposes
different approaches to evaluate or develops various tools
to monitor the task quality. The latter kind is an indirect
means that selects qualified workers to guarantee the quality
of submissions.
Existing quality control is not applicable for large-scale
crowdsourcing applications, such as urban traffic monitor-
ing and air-quality sensing, since it is a long haul for the
crowdsourcer (requestor) to verify task quality or select
professional workers in a one-by-one mode. In this scenario,
it is convenient to require workers to report the quality of
their tasks based on which the requestor pays them. Such a
naive way will obviously lead to two issues: 1) misreport. A
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worker may report his low-quality task as a high-quality one
dishonestly. 2) collusion. High-quality workers1 can save cost
by recruiting low-quality ones to work for them, through
which the low-quality workers can also gain extra income.
The above two issues make it ridiculous for the requestor
to pay relying on the quality reported by the workers them-
selves. However, the nature of requiring no quality verifica-
tion renders such a way attractive to large-scale crowdsourc-
ing applications. Hence, to make this seemly ridiculous
way feasible, we propose a misreport- and collusion-proof
crowdsourcing without quality verification in this paper.
The aim of our scheme is guiding workers to truthfully
report the quality of submitted tasks without collusion
by leveraging pricing and task allocation. In other words,
driven by the market power, workers have to try their best
to serve the requestor honestly, making the quality of tasks
can be naturally guaranteed.
However, it is challenging to realize our aim since the
capability of a worker to complete the task is kept private
to the requestor. This information asymmetry leads to the
uncertainty of the requestor’s optimal strategy, which in
turn causes the obscureness of that of any worker, result-
ing in that the Pareto optimality cannot be achieved in
crowdsourcing. To tackle the above challenge, we resort to
the mechanism design game theory [10], which empowers
the requestor to dominate the game with workers through
designing a mechanism (game rule), so that workers have
to act the way the requestor would like. In detail, the
mechanism proposed by the requester makes no room for
the workers to obtain profit through quality misreport and
collusion, and thus, the quality can be controlled without
any verification.
1. A high-quality worker refers to the one who submits the task with
high quality. Accordingly, the low-quality worker is the one with the
low-quality submitted tasks.
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2To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
simultaneously guards against quality misreport and collu-
sion among workers in crowdsourcing. The contributions in
our paper are summarized as follows:
• A crowdsourcing framework without quality verifica-
tion is proposed, where the mechanism design game
theory is leveraged to guide workers to behave hon-
estly.
• A special crowdsourcing mechanism for the two-
worker model is designed, which includes three kinds
of constraints: the participation-incentive constraint, the
incentive compatibility constraint and the collusion-
proof constraint. In addition, the property of the cost
function for any worker is deduced.
• A general crowdsourcing mechanism for multiple
workers is extended from the basic two-worker model,
which has a particularly-designed collusion-proof con-
straint for the optimal collusion scheme in the multiple-
worker scenario.
• Extensive simulation results verify the effectiveness of
the proposed misreport- and collusion-proof crowd-
sourcing mechanism.
Finally, the importance and originality of our work lie
in that it reveals some interesting and even counterintu-
itive findings, providing fresh insights into understanding
the complexity of crowdsourcing. These findings can boost
forward looking and strategic planning solutions, which are
summarized as follows:
• A high-quality worker may pretend to be a low-quality
one. The reason behind this anti-intuitive fact is when
the number of low-quality workers is large, or when
the task quality of high-quality workers enhances, the
profit of misreport by low-quality workers increases.
Thus, the requestor has to use high payment to drive
low-quality workers to behave honestly, which in turn
creates the motivation for high-quality workers to lie.
• The rise of task quality from high-quality workers may not
result in the increased utility of the requestor. When the task
quality of low-quality workers remains unchanged,
the increase of task quality from high-quality workers
implies the profits of collusion and misreport go up,
leading to more incentives for malicious behaviors. In
this case, the requestor has to pay more to reduce the
possibility of misreport and collusion, thus may reduce
her2 utility.
• The utility of the requestor may not get improved with the
increasing number of workers. Specifically, more workers
mean more chances of collusion and misreport, leading
to high cost for the requestor to prevent the occurrence
of these problems, which may lower her utility.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2,
we summarize the related work on quality control in crowd-
sourcing. An overview of our proposed quality control
framework is presented in Section 3, which is specifically
elaborated in Section 4 for the basic two-worker model and
further extended in Section 5 for the general m-worker
scenario. In Section 6, we conduct substantial simulation
experiments to evaluate the performance of our proposed
2. In this paper, we use “she” and “he” to indicate the requestor and
the worker, respectively.
mechanism and reveal several interesting findings. Finally,
we conclude the whole paper in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
In recent years, as crowdsourcing is widely used in various
fields, quality control has become the focus of research in the
crowdsourcing area. Existing research on quality control can
be generally classified into two types: task-based and worker-
based.
Task-based quality control in crowdsourcing is to assess
the quality of the tasks submitted by workers through
various indicators. One of the most common methods is to
use gold standard data [1] to measure the quality of tasks. By
comparing with standard data, it is easy to distinguish un-
qualified tasks from qualified ones. In photo crowdsourcing,
Wu et al. [2] found it challenging to use limited resources to
get photos covering the target area as much as possible, so
they adopted a scheme named image quality assessment
(IQA) to address this challenge, which was deployed in
mobile devices to filter out those low-quality photos before
sending metadata to the server thereby achieving qual-
ity control. And when investigating crowdsourcing-based
spammers, Xu et al. [3] revealed that the quality control
was conducted through strictly setting the standard to check
whether the work done by the spammer was qualified to be
paid or not, which enforced a low payment rate of 22.6%
so as to stimulate spammers to improve the quality of their
spam posts. However, in most crowdsourcing scenarios, it
is impractical or unnecessary to prepare gold standard data
in advance, so researchers proposed some machine-learning
based methods to assess task quality. In [4], Yuan et al. tried
to improve data quality in the process of crowdsourcing-
based labeled data collection through extending a classic
probabilistic model named GLAD [11], which systematically
encoded different types of side information, such as worker,
item and context information.
Worker-based quality control is often achieved by select-
ing the appropriate set of workers with the help of some
well-designed models or algorithms based on the workers’
ability or reputation. In [5], in order to slect high-quality
workers, Qiu et al. designed a dynamic contract for each
worker based on the worker’s performance and objective,
so as to elicit high-quality submissions and prevent ma-
licious behaviors. Hu et al. [6] used an economics-based
philosophy to improve workers’ quality in crowdsourcing.
Taking advantage of their proposed incentive algorithms
based on the sequential zero-determinant strategy, the re-
questor could use the market power to stimulate workers
to submit high-quality results. Han et al. [7] presented a
new crowdsoucing system to provide annotations for web
information extraction, which could collect a wide set of
behavioral features and predict annotation quality of each
worker for annotating web page structure. They collected a
set of workers’ behavioral features and discovered the rela-
tionship between the crowdsourcing quality and the work-
ers’ behavioral features. In vehicle-based crowdsourcing [8],
the relationship between spatiotemporal coverage and the
vehicle trajectory was studied to design a new strategy for
worker recruitment, which guaranteed the crowdsoucing
quality by employing the best set of participants meeting
3the application requirements. In [9], Tarable et al. proposed
a “maximum a-posteriori” decision rule to help the re-
questor make decisions in reputation-based task allocation
for crowdsourcing, which worked well even in the case of
inaccurate reputation information.
In summary, all the above quality-control schemes are
relying on additional assessing indicators or algorithms to
select tasks or workers in a one-by-one manner, which are
obviously tedious and inefficient, leading to their inappli-
cability in large-scale crowdsourcing scenarios. Therefore,
we propose a simple but effective quality control model in
crowdsourcing, which can further eliminate the collusion
behavior at the same time.
3 OVERVIEW OF OUR FRAMEWORK
According to the analysis in Section 1, achieving quality
control without verification will lead to the problems of
quality misreport and collusion. Both problems originate from
that the worker’s capability to complete tasks is his private
information in the absence of quality verification. Without
this information, the optimal strategy of the requestor is
uncertain, and so is that of any worker. To optimize the
incomplete-information game between the requestor and
workers, we take advantage of the mechanism design game
theory [10].
The mechanism design game theory is an efficient ve-
hicle to solve the game with private information, which
introduces two kinds of players, namely “the agent” and
“the principal”. The agent has private information called
“type” while the principle does not have and is unable to
access the private information of the agents. To achieve
the Pareto optimality, the mechanism design game theory
allows the principal to dominate the game with the agents
through designing a mechanism (game rule), which leads
the agents to act the way the principal would like. Specif-
ically, the principal asks the agents to report their types
(called direct mechanism) or strategies made based on the
private information (called indirect mechanism).3 Then the
principal and the agents act in light of the mechanism
the principal designed and gain the corresponding payoffs.
Whether an agent reports the true type or strategy based on
the true private information depends on if the mechanism
formulated by the principal satisfies the incentive compati-
bility (IC) constraint. The IC constraint guarantees that the
agents are motivated to behave in a manner consistent with
the principal’s optimal strategy.
In our scenario, since workers have private information,
they are agents whose types are their working capabilities.
Correspondingly, the requestor is the principal who can
design a mechanism G with the IC constraint to force any
worker to report the task quality based on his working
capability truthfully, thus solving the problem of quality
misreport. Additionally, the collusion-proof constraint is
also included in the proposed mechanism G to address the
3. According to the revelation principle, for every Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, there exists a Bayesian game with the same equilibrium
outcome but in which players truthfully report types, i.e., both the
direct mechanism and indirect mechanism produce the same results. In
this way, the principal only needs to consider the information provided
by the agents to develop the optimal strategy, so as to significantly
reduce the complexity.
Requestor Worker i
Publish tasks and the 
crowdsourcing mechanism
Submit tasks 
Pay according to 
the mechanism
Other workers
Collusion process
Ack. with task quality
×
Notify the task allocation 
and pricing
Since our mechanism is 
collusion-proof, collusion 
does not happen in practice.
Fig. 1: Overview of our framework.
issue that multiple malicious workers collude to deceive the
requestor. In this paper, we assume that malicious workers
are rational and intelligent. The overview of our framework
is shown in Fig.1, which includes the following steps:
1) The requestor publishes the tasks and the mechanism
G online.
2) If any candidate worker i accepts the tasks and the
mechanism G, he acknowledges with his task quality to
the requestor. Otherwise, he just ignores the messages
from the requestor.
3) Once receiving feedback from workers, the requestor
notifies them of the task allocation and pricing results.
4) If the malicious workers decide to collude, they will ne-
gotiate the collusion process with each other. However,
due to our collusion-proof mechanism, their optimal
strategy is not to collude.
5) After finishing the tasks, the worker submits them to
the requestor according to the requirements of G.
6) Accordingly, the requestor pays each worker in light of
the quantity and quality of the submitted tasks.
We will detail our mechanism for different scenarios in
the following two sections.
4 MECHANISM FOR THE TWO-WORKER MODEL
In this paper, we conduct the analysis following a principle
of simple to complex. We first consider the scenario where
there is one requestor, denoted by R, and two workers,
denoted by Wi (i ∈ {1, 2}), in crowdsourcing. In our
model, affected by task difficulty, equipment characteristics,
personal capability and environment [12], we consider any
worker Wi completes tasks with quality xi ∈ {x¯, x}, with x¯
and x respectively representing high and low task qualities.
Since it is difficult or costly for workers to change task
qualities by adjusting their own capabilities or other factors
such as the environment in the crowdsourcing process,
the value of xi (i ∈ {1, 2}) is fixed. That is, a high-
quality worker cannot complete low-quality tasks, and a
low-quality worker is also unable to submit tasks with high
quality. We denote the probability that a worker submits
high quality tasks with p(x¯) = p, and then p(x) = 1 − p.
We assume the joint probability of task qualities submit-
ted by the two workers as p(x1, x2). For simplicity, let
4p(x¯, x¯) = p1, p(x¯, x) = p(x, x¯) =
1
2p2, p(x, x) = p3, where
p(x¯, x) = p(x, x¯). Apparently, p1 = p2, p2 = 2p(1 − p),
p3 = (1− p)2.
To take advantage of the market power to deter mis-
report and collusion, the requestor regulates the behavior
of workers through pricing and task allocation, which are
determined according to different combinations of task
qualities claimed by the two workers. To make notations
simple, we denote the cases where both workers claim x¯,
one claims x¯ but the other claims x, and both claim x as
X1, X2, and X3, respectively. In case Xj (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}),
any Wi can obtain the payment uij = njα(xi) + tj from
the requestor at the working cost F (nj , xi), where nj and
tj are respectively the number of tasks allocated to each
worker and the extra reward used to incentivize workers to
participate in crowdsourcing honestly; α(·) is the unit payoff
for each task, which is a function of task quality. In addition,
F (·) is the cost function related to the task quality xi and the
number of tasks nj which is the common knowledge.
Based on the prior beliefs, the requestor needs to pro-
pose a crowdsourcing mechanism G to the workers, which
maps any set of quality distribution {p, x¯, x} into a set
{nj , tj} (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}). The aim of G is to maximize the
expected utility of the requestor. That is,
max
3∑
j=1
pj(Rj −
2∑
i=1
uij). (1)
In (1), Rj is the payoff of the requestor obtained from the
submissions of two workers in case Xj (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}).
Additionally, to realize the misreport- and collusion-
proof crowdsourcing, G should include the following con-
straints.
4.1 Participation-incentive and IC constraints
In order to improve the completion rate and quality of tasks,
the mechanism G should make workers willing to partici-
pate in the crowdsourcing and report the task quality truth-
fully. That is, the participation-incentive and IC constraints
should be satisfied in the mechanism G. In the following,
we first formulate the participation-incentive constraint and
then IC one, where α(xi) = xi for simplicity4.
The main idea of the participation-incentive constraint is
to guarantee that a worker has no loss when he participates
in crowdsourcing. Specifically, if a worker is with high
quality, the other worker can be either high-quality or low-
quality, corresponding to two cases X1 and X2. Hence, the
expected utility of a high-quality worker consists of two
parts: utility in X1 with probability p1 and that in X2 with
probability 12p2. In order to motivate workers to participate
in crowdsourcing, it is necessary to guarantee their expected
utility no less than 0, that is,
p1(n1x¯+t1−F (n1, x¯))+ 1
2
p2(n2x¯+t2−F (n2, x¯)) ≥ 0. (2)
Similarly, for a low-quality worker, the participation-
incentive constraint is
1
2
p2(n2x+t2−F (n2, x))+p3(n3x+t3−F (n3, x)) ≥ 0. (3)
4. Our methodology can be applied to other forms of payoff function
α(·). The aim of simplifying α(·) here is to make readers understand
our design easily.
Next, we introduce the IC constraint. As mentioned
above, the flexibility in the task number and extra reward
determined by the requestor can be used to deter any
worker to lie. If a worker doesn’t report his task quality
truthfully, the mechanism is designed to make him cannot
get the utility as expected. That is to say, this mechanism
makes the utility of an honest worker not less than that of
a worker who misrepresents task quality. We take a high-
quality worker as an example. When he reports truthfully,
his expected utility is the linear combination of the utility
in case X1 and that in case X2. When he lies about task
quality, the utility in case X1 turns into that in case X2
while the utility in case X2 becomes that in X3. Hence, the
IC constraint of a high-quality worker can be written as
p1(n1x¯+ t1 − F (n1, x¯)) + 1
2
p2(n2x¯+ t2 − F (n2, x¯)) ≥
p1(n2x+ t2 − F (n2, x¯)) + 1
2
p2(n3x+ t3 − F (n3, x¯)).
(4)
Similarly, for a low-quality worker, the IC constraint is
1
2
p2(n2x+ t2 − F (n2, x)) + p3(n3x+ t3 − F (n3, x)) ≥
1
2
p2(n1x¯+ t1 − F (n1, x)) + p3(n2x¯+ t2 − F (n2, x)).
(5)
It is worth noting that the IC constraint for the high-
quality worker presented in (4) is indispensable even it
seems very unlikely that a high-quality worker will pretend
to be low-quality. In fact, as a rational and utility-driven
player, once the high-quality worker finds it more profitable
to be low-quality, he will definitely lie about his quality
level to pursue utility maximization. This phenomenon is
highly possible to happen when there is no guarantee of
IC constraint for the high-quality worker. Because in this
case, the requestor will put more consideration on how to
avoid the problem of low-quality worker’s lying, that is,
how to make the honest low-quality workers gain more
payoff than the dishonest ones. And when the probability
of high-quality submission p(x¯) is small, in order to pre-
vent the low-quality worker from lying, the mechanism
designed by the requestor will inevitably enforce greater
number of tasks and larger amount of extra reward on
the low-quality worker, which will in turn result in an
unexpected situation where the high-quality worker will get
more profit when lying. For example, when x¯ = 9, x = 1
and n1 = 1, n2 = 4, n3 = 3, the optimal value of t1, t2
and t3 can be expressed as 1.235, −3.32p + 99.35 and
−210.579p+ 143.76 through linear regression5. Substituting
these expressions into (4), we can find that when p < 0.4, the
high-quality worker will choose to lie, which is obviously
unexpected in practice. Thus, to eliminate this problem, we
have to include the IC constraint for the high-quality worker
as shown in (4).
5. Because any arbitrary set of {n1, n2, n3} responds to an optimal
set of {t1, t2, t3} maximizing the utility of the requestor with corre-
sponding constraints, we directly set the values of {n1, n2, n3} here
for simplicity. In addition, the optimal set of {t1, t2, t3} here is solved
with the participation-incentive constraint, IC constraint for the the
low-quality worker and the collusion-proof constraint which we will
discuss later, but without the IC constraint for the high-quality worker
to identify the necessity of it.
54.2 Collusion-proof constraint
Generally, a common purpose of the two workers is to
maximize their total expected utility, i.e.,
max
3∑
j=1
2∑
i=1
pj(uij − F (nj , xi)). (6)
When the two workers are both high-quality, they ob-
viously have no need to behave maliciously. While if both
are low-quality, the IC constraint makes no room for them
to pretend to be high-quality so that the requestor has to
pay based on the low quality no matter who completes the
tasks. In other words, there is no chance to collude when
they are both low-quality workers. Hence, the collusion will
only occur when the task qualities of the two workers are
different, where the low-quality worker completes a part of
or even the whole task which is supposed to be finished
by the high-quality worker, so that the low-quality worker
can earn more reward while the high-quality one is able to
reduce the working cost. Such a malicious behavior cannot
be prevented by the IC constraint, pressing a need to design
the collusion-proof constraint for the mechanism G, which
is detailed as follows.
Without collusion, the total utility of the workers is
n2(x¯ + x) + 2t2 − F (n2, x¯) − F (n2, x). If the high-quality
worker colludes with the low-quality one through assigning
k units of task to the low-quality worker to complete, their
total utility would become n2(x¯+x) + 2t2−F (n2− k, x¯)−
F (n2 + k, x) (k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n2}). In order to prevent
collusion, our mechanism G should be designed to make
sure that their total utility without collusion will never be
less than that with collusion. In other words, the following
inequation should be satisfied
F (n2, x¯) + F (n2, x) ≤ F (n2 − k, x¯) + F (n2 + k, x), (7)
k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n2}.
For ease of calculation and analysis, let F (n, x) = f(n)x.
As f(n)x is the cost required for a worker to complete
tasks, the function f(·) should be an non-negative and non-
decreasing function in [n2 − k, n2 + k].
Proposition 1. The mechanism G entails that if f(·) is a mono-
tonically increasing function, i.e., f(·)′ > 0, in [n2 − k, n2 + k],
it is also a concave one, i.e., f(·)′′ > 0.
Proof. According to (7),
f(n2)x¯+ f(n2)x ≤ f(n2 − k)x¯+ f(n2 + k)x
⇒ (f(n2)− f(n2 − k))x¯ ≤ (f(n2 + k)− f(n2))x
k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n2}.
(8)
If f(·)′ > 0, that is, f(·) is monotonically increasing, then
f(n2)− f(n2 − k)
f(n2 + k)− f(n2) ≤ x/x¯, k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n2}. (9)
Obviously, f(·) is a concave function, i.e., f(·)′′ > 0.
Under the assumption of f(·)′ > 0, we can see that the
larger the value of k (the number of collusive tasks), the
smaller the workers’ cost. Therefore the workers’ optimal
collusion strategy is that all the tasks of the high-quality
worker are completed by the low-quality one, i.e., k = n2.
In order to avoid collusion, our mechanism should satisfy
the following constraint
f(n2)− f(0)
f(2n2)− f(n2) ≤ x/x¯. (10)
(10) guarantees that even though the malicious workers
adopt the optimal collusion strategy, the total expected
utility of colluded workers cannot be larger than that when
they behave honestly. Thus, collusion-proof is realized in
crowdsourcing.
It should be noted that the assumption of f(·)′ > 0
is consistent with most practical scenarios, where as the
number of tasks increases, the cost of workers grows.
5 MECHANISM FOR THE m-WORKER MODEL
In this section, we discuss the m-worker (m > 2) scenario
which is a general case and can be derived from the above
optimization process.
In a general model, there is one requestor R andmwork-
ers W1,W2, · · · ,Wm, whose task qualities are denoted as
x1, x2, · · · , xm. We use caseXj (j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m,m+1}) to
represent the situation where there arem+1−j high-quality
workers among the m workers. pj is the probability of case
Xj and it is easy to know that pj = Cm+1−jm pm+1−j(1 −
p)j−1 due to p(x¯) = p, where Cim is the combination calcu-
lation Cim =
i!
m!(m−i)! . The mechanism G proposed by the
requestor maps any set of quality distribution {p, x¯, x} into
a binary group {nj , tj}, where nj and tj are the task number
and extra reward in case Xj (j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m,m + 1}). In
the jth case, Wi spends F (nj , xi) and earns uij = njxi + tj
from the requestor. Similar to Section 4, the aim of G is to
maximize the requestor’s expected utility. That is,
max
m+1∑
j=1
pj(Rj −
m∑
i=1
uij). (11)
In (11), Rj is the payoff of the requestor obtained from the
submissions of all workers in caseXj and uij is the payment
to worker i in case Xj (j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m,m+ 1}).
To realize the misreport- and collusion-proof crowd-
sourcing, G should meet the IC, the participation-incentive
and the collusion-proof constraints, which are described in
the following.
For any high-quality worker, his expected utility is
related to the number of other high-quality workers in
crowdsourcing. In detail, when there are total m − i high-
quality workers including himself, case Xi occurs with the
probability of Cm−im−1pm+1−i(1− p)i−1 =
Cm−im−1
Cm+1−im
pi. Thus, in
case Xi , the expected utility of this high-quality worker
is
Cm+1−im−1
Cm+1−im
pi(nix + ti − F (ni, x)). However, when the high-
quality worker feigns a low-quality one, the requestor will
consider there are m − (i + 1) high-quality workers, and
hence, the number of tasks and extra reward to this worker
are respectively ni+1 and ti+1. Thus, the expected utility
of this high-quality worker turns to be
Cm−im−1
Cm+1−im
pi(ni+1x +
ti+1−F (ni+1, x¯)). Considering i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, the IC and
the participation-incentive constraints can be formulated by
(12) and (13) as follows, implying that the expected utility
of a high-quality worker when he honestly participates in
6crowdsourcing is not less than that when he misreports the
task quality to the requestor or even does not join in the
crowdsourcing.
m∑
i=1
Cm−im−1
Cm+1−im
pi(nix¯+ ti − F (ni, x¯)) ≥
m∑
i=1
Cm−im−1
Cm+1−im
pi(ni+1x+ ti+1 − F (ni+1, x¯)),
(12)
m∑
i=1
Cm−im−1
Cm+1−im
pi(nix¯+ ti − F (ni, x¯)) ≥ 0. (13)
Similarly, for a low-quality worker, his IC and
participation-incentive constraints are respectively written
as
m+1∑
i=2
Cm+1−im−1
Cm+1−im
pi(nix+ ti − F (ni, x)) ≥
m+1∑
i=2
Cm+1−im−1
Cm+1−im
pi(ni−1x¯+ ti−1 − F (ni−1, x¯)),
(14)
m+1∑
i=2
Cm+1−im−1
Cm+1−im
pi(nix+ ti − F (ni, x)) ≥ 0. (15)
Next, we will analyze the issue of collusion. As in the
case of two workers, collusion does not occur when the
qualities of all workers are the same, so we only consider
the collusion in the case where the workers’ task quali-
ties are different. Take three workers as an example, we
can find that collusion may occur in two cases, namely
the case that there are 2 high-quality workers represented
by {x¯, x¯, x}, as well as the case that there is 1 high-
quality worker represented by {x¯, x, x}6. In the case of
{x¯, x¯, x}, the total utility of all workers without collusion
is n2(2x¯ + x) + 3t2 − 2F (n2, x¯) − F (n2, x). Assume that
W1 and W2 are both the high-quality workers while W3 is
the low-quality one, we can find that the costs of W1 and
W2 are both F (n2, x¯) while W3’s cost is F (n2, x). When W1
and W2 respectively require W3 to complete k1 ∈ [0, n2]
and k2 ∈ [0, n2] tasks, their costs change to F (n2 − k1, x¯)+
collusion expense7, F (n2 − k2, x¯)+ collusion expense, and
F (n2, x) + F (n2, x) + F (n2, x) respectively. The workers’
total utility after collusion is n2(2x¯+x)+3t2−F (n2−k1, x¯)−
F (n2− k2, x¯)−F (n2 + k1 + k2, x). Through comparing the
total utility before and after collusion, the collusion-proof
constraint can be written as
2F (n2, x¯) + F (n2, x) ≤
F (n2 − k1, x¯)+F (n2 − k2, x¯) + F (n2 + k1 + k2, x),
k1, k2 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n2}.
(16)
Likewise, in the case of {x¯, x, x}, if there is no collusion,
the cost of W1 is F (n3, x¯), while those of W2 and W3 are
both F (n3, x). When W1 requires W2 and W3 to complete
6. {x¯, x¯, x} does not indicate the task quality of any specific worker
is low or high but represents all the scenarios where there are 2 high-
quality workers and 1 low-quality one. So does {x¯, x, x}.
7. The collusion expense is the reward the high-quality worker paid
to the low-quality one in order to facilitate collusion which including
the low-quality worker’s cost of completing the collusion tasks and the
collusion bribe.
k1 and k2 tasks respectively (k1 + k2 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n3}),
their costs change to F (n3−k1−k2, x¯)+ collusion expense,
F (n3, x) +F (k1, x) and F (n3, x) +F (k2, x). The collusion-
proof constraint can be written as
F (n3, x¯) + 2F (n3, x) ≤
F (n3 − k1 − k2,x¯) + F (n3 + k1, x) + F (n3 + k2, x),
k1 + k2 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n3}.
(17)
(16) and (17) guarantee that the total utility of all workers
when they collude will not be greater than that when they
behave honestly in the above two cases, so that the workers
have no motivation to collude.
With the same assumption F (n, x) = f(n)x mentioned
in Section 4, when f(·) is monotonically increasing, f(·)′′ ≥
0 can be deduced with the similar method used above. In
the case of {x¯, x¯, x}, when collusion occurs, it is obvious
that the total cost of the workers (i.e., the right part of the
inequality) minimizes at k1 = k2 = n2, because the cost
saved by collusion is the most. And in the case of {x¯, x, x}, it
is also obvious that the total cost minimizes at k1 +k2 = n3.
According to the nature of the concave function f(x1) +
f(x2) ≥ 2f(x1+x22 ), we have f(n3 + k1) + f(n3 + k2) ≥
2f(n3+k1+n3+k22 ) = 2f(
3n3
2 ). So in this case, the total cost
minimizes at k1 = k2 = 12n3. Therefore, (16) and (17) can be
transferred to
2f(n2)x¯+ f(n2)x ≤ 2f(0)x¯+ f(3n2)x, (18)
f(n3)x¯+ 2f(n3)x ≤ f(0)x¯+ 2f(3
2
n3)x, (19)
which implies that the maximum utility of any worker
that can be achieved by collusion is less than that without
collusion. At this point, workers will give up collusion.
For m workers, there are m − 1 cases in total
will incur collusion, which could be represented by
{x¯, x¯, · · · , x¯, x}, {x¯, x¯, · · · , x¯, x, x}, · · · , {x¯, x, · · · , x}. And
in the ith case, the number of high-quality workers is (m−i),
then the total utility of all workers in case i before collusion
is
Ui =ni+1((m− i)x¯+ ix) +mti+1
−(m− i)F (ni+1, x¯)− i · F (ni+1, x). (20)
Based on the analysis above, we still let F (n, x) = f(n)x
and assume that f(·) is a monotonically increasing and
concave function. When the workers collude, their optimal
strategy is that all tasks of high-quality workers are equally
assigned to low-quality workers due to the nature of con-
cave function
∑n
i f(xi) ≥ nf(
∑n
i xi
n ). Thus, the total utility
of all the malicious workers after using the optimal collusion
strategy is
U′i =ni+1((m− i)x¯+ ix) +mti+1
−(m− i)f(0)x¯− i · f(ni+1 + m− i
i
ni+1)x.
(21)
Based on (20) and (21), the collusion-proof constraint for the
ith case is
(m− i)f(ni+1)x¯+ i · f(ni+1)x ≤
(m− i)f(0)x¯+ i · f(ni+1 + m− i
i
ni+1)x,
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m− 1}
(22)
7which implies even though the malicious workers adopt
the optimal collusion strategy, their total utility is still not
larger than that when they do not collude. Thus, the goal of
collusion-proof can be achieved in the m-worker model.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the impacts of some key param-
eters on the performance of our proposed crowdsourcing
mechanism through extensive simulations.
6.1 Two workers
We first analyze the situation of two workers presented in
Section 4. Basically, we utilize the following set of functions8
to calculate (1) to (5), and (10): f(n) = 2n−1, R1 = 2x¯×n21,
R2 = (x¯+x)×n22, R3 = 2x×n23. Considering that the actual
meaning of ni (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is the number of tasks assigned
to each worker under three different cases Xi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}),
we restrict them as positive integers.
To begin with, we investigate the change laws of the re-
questor’s optimal utility in Fig. 2. As shown in Fig. 2(a), we
present the optimal utility changing with different p(x¯) and
x¯ given a fixed x; in Fig. 2(b), we report the change of the op-
timal utility with various p(x¯) and x when x¯ is fixed. From
these two figures, one can see that when x¯ or x is settled,
the requestor’s optimal utility increases with the increasing
p(x¯). The reason is that the greater p(x¯) is, the more high-
quality tasks the requestor receives, which finally increases
the requestor’s utility. Besides, when one of x¯ and x is fixed,
the larger the difference between high and low quality ∆x,
the higher increment of the requestor’s optimal utility due
to the change of p(x¯). That is, when ∆x is increasing, p(x¯)
has more influence on the requestor’s utility. The underlying
reason is that the larger ∆x incurs the larger difference of
utility brought by the high-quality worker and low-quality
one, which will amplify the improvement of the optimal
utility resulted from the increasing p(x¯). Last but not least,
for a specific p(x¯), one can observe that the requestor’s op-
timal utility becomes smaller with the increasing x¯, shown
in Fig. 2(a), but comes to be larger with the increasing x,
presented in Fig. 2(b). This is because when x is constant,
the increase of x¯ implies that collusion and misreport turn to
be more profitable, incentivizing more malicious behaviors
from workers, which drives the requestor to spend more to
eliminate these undesirable behaviors, leading to less utility
for her. While when x¯ is given, the larger x makes the profit
of the low-quality worker’s lying become trivial, dispelling
his enthusiasm of behaving maliciously, which enables the
increase of the requestor’s optimal utility.
Next, to explore the relationships between ni (i ∈
{1, 2, 3}) and ∆x, p(x¯), x¯, we solve the optimization prob-
lem with fixed ∆x, p(x¯) and x¯, respectively, and analyze the
corresponding experimental results. In TABLE 1, we report
the changing trend of n1, n2 and n3 in different cases. The
parameter settings in each case are clarified in this table,
and the meanings of horizontal and vertical coordinates are
specified in the corresponding figures.
8. We also test other function settings which present similar results.
Hence, we do not present them for brevity.
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Fig. 2: The optimal utility of the requestor in different
situations.
From the first column of figures in TABLE 1, we can see
that the changing trend of n1 has the following characteris-
tics:
1) As shown in the first two and the last two figures, the
value of n1 keeps stable or increasing with the increase of
p(x¯). This is because n1 corresponds to the situation where
both workers are of high quality, so the more likely the
high-quality worker appears, the higher value of n1 that
the requestor needs to set to achieve the IC constraint for
the high-quality worker and avoid any potential lie.
2) In the middle two figures, as x¯ increases, n1 remains
stable or increases. The reason is that the increase of x¯ drives
the requestor to increase n1 for achieving the IC constraint.
3) In the first two figures, when x increases, one can
find that n1 remains unchanged or increases. To be specific,
when ∆x is fixed, the increasing x indicates the increase of
x¯, which makes the requestor enlarge n1 to satisfy the IC
constraint.
Through comparing the second column of figures, we
can find that n2 changes with the following features:
1) From the first two figures and the last two ones, it is
obvious that n2 keeps unchanged or becomes larger with
the increasing p(x¯). This is because n2 represents the task
allocation in the case of one high-quality worker and one
low-quality worker, which affects the IC constraint and
the collision-proof constraint at the same time. As p(x¯)
increases, the likelihood that a worker is a high-quality
one increases, which makes the problem of high-quality
worker’s lying more serious. This situation is very similar
to n1, so the requestor needs to increase n2 to guarantee the
IC constraint.
2) Observing the first two figures in this column, one
can get the conclusion that n2 owns a trend of decreasing
first and then increasing with the increase of x; and in all
8the rest of figures in this column, n2 first decreases and
then increases with the increasing ∆x. This is because, on
one hand, n2 affects all constraints, making the requestor
increase n2 to achieve these constraints; on the other hand,
the increase of n2 will lead to more low-quality submissions
for the requestor, lowering its utility, which is exactly op-
posite to the optimization direction. So n2 finally shows a
trend of decreasing first and then increasing. In detail, take
the middle two figures as an example, with the fixed p(x¯)
and x¯, when ∆x is small, x decreases as ∆x increases. In
this case, due to the relatively small quality difference, the
problems of workers’ lying and collusion are not so serious,
then the requestor can improve its utility through reducing
the number of low-quality tasks with a lower n2. When ∆x
gradually increases, the problems of workers’ lying and col-
lusion become more severe, then n2 comes to the minimum.
When ∆x increases to the maximum, the workers’ lying and
collusion problem turns to be terrible, where the requestor
needs to increase n2 to satisfy all constraints. Therefore, n2
presents a trend of decreasing first and then increasing.
Finally, we scrutinize the third column of figures for n3:
1) As can be seen from all these figures, the overall
change of n3 is not obvious and remains generally un-
changed. This is because, on the one hand, n3 corresponds
to the case of two low-quality workers, where increasing
n3 means getting more low-quality tasks, opposite to the
optimization direction; on the other hand, reducing n3 may
result in failure to meet the IC constraint of the low-quality
worker. These two conflicting factors are balanced in most
cases, making n3 relatively stable.
2) As we can see from the first two and the last two
figures, n3 stays the same or decreases with the increase
of p(x¯). Because when p(x¯) increases, the possibility that
both workers are low-quality ones is reduced, so that the
requestor can appropriately decrease n3 to improve her
utility by receiving less low-quality tasks.
3) From the 3rd figure with a lower p(x¯), n3 decreases
first and then increases with the increasing ∆x, which is
because the probability of two low-quality workers is high,
so the two factors mentioned in the first item cannot be
balanced. To be specific, when ∆x is small, the benefit of
low-quality worker’s lying is low, where the cost for the
requestor to meet the IC constraint is also small, so the
requestor can lower n3 to improve her utility. While when
∆x is large, the problem of the low-quality worker’s lying
becomes more rigorous than the low utility due to many
low-quality submissions, so the requestor will increase n3 to
satisfy the IC constraint. These two aspects generally make
n3 decrease first and then increase.
It is worth noting that since t1, t2 and t3 in the experi-
ments present no obvious trend9, we do not analyze them
in detail.
6.2 Three workers
Similar to the situation of two workers, we utilize the
following set of functions to calculate (12) to (15) and (22):
9. The underlying reason is the limitation of positive integers for n1,
n2 and n3. And thus when ni (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) changes in the integer
dimension, the originally continuous ti will come to abrupt change so
we can’t find obvious changing trend of t1, t2 and t3.
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Fig. 3: Optimal utility comparison between two workers and
three workers.
f(n) = 2n − 1, R1 = 3x¯n21, R2 = (2x¯ + x)n22, R3 =
(x¯ + 2x)n23, R4 = 3xn
2
4. We still limit ni(i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4})
to positive integers and do linear programming to solve the
constrained optimization problem.
In Fig. 3, we compare the different trends of requestor’s
utility Ur changing with p(x¯) when the numbers of workers
are two and three, respectively, with two different parameter
settings of x¯ and x. Both figures show that the requestor’s
utility is positively related to p(x¯) ∈ [0.1, 0.9]. It is worth
noting that according to the experimental results, the re-
questor’s utility does not increase with the increasing num-
ber of workers. To be specific, when p = 0.4 in Fig. 3(a), the
requestor’s optimal utility of the two-worker case is higher
than that of the three-worker case, while when p = 0.9,
three workers is much more better than two workers. This
is because more workers incur more constraints in the
optimization problem, which leads to that fewer workers
sometimes can bring more utility to the requestor.
Note that the changing trends of utility with p(x¯), x¯, x
is similar to that of the two-worker situation, so we exclude
these results due to the limitation of page length.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a misreport- and collusion-proof
crowdsourcing mechanism, guiding workers to truthfully
report the quality of submitted tasks without collusion by
leveraging pricing and task allocation. Extensive simulation
results verify the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism,
based on which we can obtain three counterintuitive find-
ings: 1) a high-quality worker may pretend to be a low-
quality one; 2) the rise of task quality from high-quality
workers may not result in the increased utility of the re-
questor; 3) the utility of the requestor may not get improved
with the increasing number of workers. In addition, we can
also draw the following conclusions: 1) with the increase of
p(x¯), n1 and n2 increase while n3 decreases; 2) the utility of
the requestor goes up with the increase of p(x¯). Moreover,
the higher the ∆x, the larger the increment of her utility.
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